uid_eq

Type	Parameter	Name
kuid_t	left
kuid_t	right

**Caller**
Name	Describe
restricted_pointer
rdtgroup_kn_set_ugid	set uid and gid of rdtgroup dirs and files to that of the creator
rdtgroup_task_write_permission
__ptrace_may_access	Returns 0 on success, -errno on denial.
uid_hash_find
kill_ok_by_cred	alled with RCU read lock from check_kill_permission()
kill_as_cred_perm
set_one_prio_perm	Returns true if current's euid is same as p's uid or euid,* or has CAP_SYS_NICE to p's user_ns.* Called with rcu_read_lock, creds are safe
SYSCALL_DEFINE3
SYSCALL_DEFINE2	Ugh. To avoid negative return values, "getpriority()" will* not return the normal nice-value, but a negated value that* has been offset by 20 (ie it returns 40..1 instead of -20..19)* to stay compatible.
check_prlimit_permission	lock must be held
cred_cap_issubset
commit_creds	mmit_creds - Install new credentials upon the current task@new: The credentials to be assigned Install a new set of credentials to the current task, using RCU to replace* the old set. Both the objective and the subjective credentials pointers are
find_ucounts
check_same_owner	Check the target process has a UID that matches the current process's:
cgroup_kn_set_ugid	set uid and gid of cgroup dirs and files to that of the creator
__cgroup1_procs_write
new_idmap_permitted
audit_compare_rule	Compare two rules in kernel format. Considered success if rules* don't match.
audit_uid_comparator
ipcperms	pcperms - check ipc permissions@ns: ipc namespace@ipcp: ipc permission set@flag: desired permission set Check user, group, other permissions for access* to ipc resources. return 0 if allowed*@flag will most probably be 0 or ``S_
ipcctl_obtain_check	pcctl_obtain_check - retrieve an ipc object and check permissions@ns: ipc namespace@ids: the table of ids where to look for the ipc@id: the id of the ipc to retrieve@cmd: the cmd to check@perm: the permission to set@extra_perm: one extra permission
shmctl_do_lock
set_task_ioprio
SYSCALL_DEFINE3
SYSCALL_DEFINE2
key_alloc	key_alloc - Allocate a key of the specified type.@type: The type of key to allocate.@desc: The key description to allow the key to be searched out.@uid: The owner of the new key.@gid: The group ID for the new key's group permissions.
key_payload_reserve	key_payload_reserve - Adjust data quota reservation for the key's payload*@key: The key to make the reservation for
keyctl_chown_key	Change the ownership of a key* The key must grant the caller Setattr permission for this to work, though* the key need not be fully instantiated yet. For the UID to be changed, or* for the GID to be changed to a group the caller is not a member of, the
keyctl_setperm_key	Change the permission mask on a key.* The key must grant the caller Setattr permission for this to work, though* the key need not be fully instantiated yet. If the caller does not have
keyctl_session_to_parent	Attempt to install the calling process's session keyring on the process's* parent process.* The keyring must exist and must grant the caller LINK permission, and the* parent process must be single-threaded and must have the same effective
key_task_permission	key_task_permission - Check a key can be used@key_ref: The key to check.@cred: The credentials to use.@perm: The permissions to check for. Check to see whether permission is granted to use a key in the desired way,
proc_key_users_show
keyctl_get_persistent	Get the persistent keyring for a specific UID and link it to the nominated* keyring.
cap_capable	ap_capable - Determine whether a task has a particular effective capability@cred: The credentials to use@ns: The user namespace in which we need the capability@cap: The capability to check for@opts: Bitmask of options defined in include/linux/security
__is_real
__is_eff
__is_setuid
cap_emulate_setxuid	ap_emulate_setxuid() fixes the effective / permitted capabilities of* a process after a call to setuid, setreuid, or setresuid.* 1) When setuiding _from_ one of {r,e,s}uid == 0 _to_ all of {r,e,s}uid != 0, the permitted and effective capabilities are
cap_task_fix_setuid	ap_task_fix_setuid - Fix up the results of setuid() call@new: The proposed credentials@old: The current task's current credentials@flags: Indications of what has changed Fix up the results of setuid() call before the credential changes are
tomoyo_manager	moyo_manager - Check whether the current process is a policy manager.* Returns true if the current process is permitted to modify policy* via /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.* Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
policy_view_capable	policy_view_capable - check if viewing policy in at @ns is allowed* Returns: true if viewing policy is allowed* If @ns is NULL then the namespace being viewed is assumed to be the* tasks current namespace.
aa_compute_fperms	aa_compute_fperms - convert dfa compressed perms to internal perms@dfa: dfa to compute perms for (NOT NULL)@state: state in dfa@cond: conditions to consider (NOT NULL) TODO: convert from dfa + state to permission entry, do computation conversion
_setuid_policy_lookup	Compute a decision for a transition from @src to @dst under @policy.
uid_permitted_for_cred	Check whether a caller with old credentials @old is allowed to switch to* credentials that contain @new_uid.
do_faccessat	access() needs to use the real uid/gid, not the effective uid/gid.* We do this by temporarily clearing all FS-related capabilities and* switching the fsuid/fsgid around to the real ones.
allow_file_dedupe	Check whether we are allowed to dedupe the destination file
setup_new_exec
acl_permission_check	This does the basic permission checking
may_follow_link	may_follow_link - Check symlink following for unsafe situations@nd: nameidata pathwalk data In the case of the sysctl_protected_symlinks sysctl being enabled,* CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE needs to be specifically ignored if the symlink is
may_create_in_sticky	may_create_in_sticky - Check whether an O_CREAT open in a sticky directory* should be allowed, or not, on files that already* exist
__check_sticky
sigio_perm
inode_owner_or_capable	de_owner_or_capable - check current task permissions to inode@inode: inode being checked Return true if current either has CAP_FOWNER in a namespace with the* inode owner uid mapped, or owns the file.
chown_ok
chgrp_ok
generic_setlease	generic_setlease - sets a lease on an open file@filp: file pointer@arg: type of lease to obtain@flp: input - file_lock to use, output - file_lock inserted@priv: private data for lm_setup (may be NULL if lm_setup* doesn't require it)* The (input)
posix_acl_permission	Return 0 if current is granted want access to the inode* by the acl. Returns -E... otherwise.
do_coredump
dquot_transfer	Wrapper for transferring ownership of an inode for uid/gid only* Called from FSXXX_setattr()
v1_commit_dqblk
check_quotactl_permission
qid_eq	qid_eq - Test to see if to kquid values are the same@left: A qid value@right: Another quid value* Return true if the two qid values are equal and false otherwise.

Function report